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Abstract
In this paper, we establish a relation between an argumentation based system: Defeasible Logic Programming
(DELP), and a nonmonotonic system: Reiter’s Default Logic. This relation is achieved by introducing a variant
of DELP and a transformation that maps default theories to defeasible logic programs. The transformation
allows to associate the answers of a DELP Interpreter with the consequences, credulous and skeptical, of the
default theory. Thus, this work establishes a link between a well understood nonmonotonic system and a
argumentation based system. This link could be studied separately and could be exploited for the development
of the latter system.
Keywords: Knowledge Representation, Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Argumentative Reasoning, Default Logic,
Defeasible Logic Programming.
1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
In general, it is interesting and important to compare, analyze and assess the alternative tools that
could be used to confront a specific problem. In particular, in the area of Artificial Intelligence there
are several research lines dedicated to the development of formalisms and tools regarding Knowledge
Representation. These formalisms are so diverse that many times it is difficult to recognize their ad-
vantages, disadvantages and differences in order to make a plausible use of them. For this reason, it is
interesting to analyze the relation among knowledge representation formalisms to evaluate their dif-
ferences and similarities. Several works relating diverse approaches of defeasible and non-monotonic
reasoning have been developed [8, 7, 5, 6, 2, 3].
In this paper, we analyze the relation between an argumentation based system like Defeasible
Logic Programming (DELP), and a nonmonotonic system like Reiter’s Default Logic. In order to
establish this relation we introduce (Seccion 3) a variant of DELP, called DELP∅ , and a number
of properties it verifies. Then, we define a transformation (Seccion 5) that allows to map default
theories to defeasible logic programs. The transformation allows to associate the answers of a DELP∅
interpreter with the consequences, credulous and skeptical, of the original default theory. Finally, we
relate the results of this work with the Dung’s argumentative framework for Default Logic defined in
[9], and we briefly discuss how the relation established between Default Logic an DELP can be used
to relate DELP to other meaningful non-monotonic formalisms.
This work is partially supported by Conicet (PIP 5050), Agencia de Investigacio´n Cientı´fica y Tecnol o´gica (PICT
13096,15043 and PAV 076) and SCyT-UNS (24/N016). Telma Delladio is partially supported by CONICET.
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2 DELP
Defeasible Logic Programming (DELP) is a formalism that combines Logic Programming and De-
feasible Argumentation. In DELP, knowledge is represented using facts, strict rules or defeasible
rules:
• Facts are ground literals representing atomic information or the negation of atomic information
using the strong negation “¬ ” (e.g. ¬ rain).
• Strict Rules are denoted L0 ← L1, . . . , Ln, where the head L0 is a ground literal and the body
{Li}i>0 is a set of ground literals (e.g. ¬ day ← night).
• Defeasible Rules are denoted L0 —≺ L1, . . . , Ln, where the head L0 is a ground literal and the
body {Li}i>0 is a set of ground literals. (e.g. cold —≺ winter).
Syntactically, the symbol “—≺” is all that distinguishes a defeasible rule from a strict one. Pragmat-
ically, a defeasible rule is used to represent defeasible knowledge, i.e. tentative information that may
be used if nothing could be posed against it. A defeasible rule “Head —≺ Body.” is understood as ex-
pressing that “reasons to believe in the antecedent Body provide reasons to believe in the consequent
Head” [14].
A Defeasible Logic Program (de.l.p.) P is a set of facts, strict rules and defeasible rules. When
required, P is denoted (Π,∆) distinguishing the subset Π of facts and strict rules, and the subset ∆of
defeasible rules. Observe that strict and defeasible rules are ground.
Strong negation is allowed in the head of program rules, and hence may be used to represent con-
tradictory knowledge. From a program (Π,∆) contradictory literals could be derived, however, the
set Π (which is used to represent non-defeasible information) must possess certain internal coherence.
Therefore, Π has to be non-contradictory, i.e. no pair of contradictory literals can be derived from Π.
Given a literal L the complement with respect to strong negation will be denoted L (i.e. a = ¬ a and
¬ a = a).
DELP incorporates an argumentation formalism for the treatment of the contradictory knowledge
that can be derived from (Π,∆) This formalism allows the identification of the pieces of knowledge
that are in contradiction. A dialectical process is used for deciding which information prevails. In
particular, the argumentation-based definition of the inference relation makes it possible to incorporate
a treatment of preferences in an elegant way.
In DELP a literal L is warranted from (Π,∆) if there exists a non-defeated argumentA supporting
L. In short, an argument for a literal L, denoted 〈A, L〉, is a minimal set of defeasible rules A⊆∆
such thatA∪Π is non-contradictory and there is a derivation for L from A∪Π. In order to establish if
〈A, L〉 is a non-defeated argument, argument rebuttals or counter-arguments that could be defeaters
for 〈A, L〉 are considered, i.e., counter-arguments that by some criterion are preferred to 〈A, L〉. An
argument 〈A1, L1〉 counter-argues or attacks 〈A2, L2〉 at some literal h, if and only if there exists a
subargument 〈A, h〉 of 〈A2, L2〉 (i.e. A ⊆ A2) such that h and L2 disagree; that is, Π ∪ {h,L2} is
contradictory.
Since counter-arguments are arguments, there may exist defeaters for them, and defeaters for these
defeaters, and so on. Thus, a sequence of arguments called argumentation line is constructed, where
each argument defeats its predecessor in the line. Some restrictions are imposed over these lines to
be considered acceptable argumentation lines.
• Non circularity: circular argumentation lines are not permitted
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• Concordance: the set of supporting arguments must be non contradictory and the same is re-
quired for interfering arguments.
• Blocking-Blocking situations: if a blocking defeater Ai occurs in the line [A1, . . . , Ak], Ai+1
cannot be a blocking defeater for Ai
Usually, each argument has more than one defeater and more than one argumentation line exists.
Therefore, a tree of arguments called dialectical tree is constructed, where the root is 〈A, h〉 and
each path from the root to a leaf is an argumentation line. A dialectical analysis of this tree is used
for deciding whether h is warranted. This dialectical analysis is carried out labelling the arguments
conforming the dialectical tree. The arguments in the leaves of the tree are considered undefeated.
Every inner node with at least a child marked as undefeated, is considered and marked as a defeated
argument. In the other case, it is undefeated. Following this analysis, a literal h is said warranted if
there is a dialectical tree where the root is an argument for h that has been marked as undefeated (for
a detailed explanation of this dialectical process see [10]).
In DELP, given a query Q there are four possible answers: YES, if Q is warranted; NO, if the
complement of Q is warranted; UNDECIDED, if neither Q nor its complement is warranted; and
UNKNOWN, if Q is not in the language of the program.
3 DELP∅ VARIANT
In DELP, several elements can be adjusted thus defining a number of variants of DELP; for instance,
the notions of attack and defeat, as well as the conditions required for acceptable argumentation lines.
We will consider a DELP variant, that we call DELP∅ , observing the following condition:
• The relation defining the comparison criterion is the empty set.
In general, given two conflicting arguments A and B, they can be compared using some criterion.
In that case, if A is better than B, A is a proper defeater for B. But, if neither of the two is better than
the other, A is a blocking defeater for B, and vice versa. Note that, in DELP∅ , since the comparison
criterion is empty, every attack is a blocking defeat and since there are no proper defeaters, this
criterion turns attack into defeat.
Remark 3.1
Every argumentation line in DELP∅ contains two arguments at most.
Suppose there is an acceptable argumentation line Γ = [A1, . . . , An], n > 2. In such case, there
is a subsequence of arguments [Ai, Ai+1, Ai+2] in Γ. Since every defeater in DELP∅ is a blocking
defeater, Ai+2 is a blocking defeater for Ai+1 and, Ai+1 is a blocking defeater for Ai. But, in this
case, Γ would not be an acceptable argumentation line, because there cannot be two consecutive
blocking attacks (see the third condition of an acceptable argumentation line).
Remark 3.2
Every dialectical tree in DELP∅ has, at most, two levels.
Since every path of a dialectical tree is an acceptable argumentation line, and in DELP∅ , argu-
mentation lines are composed by one or two arguments, every path contains, at most, two arguments.
Thus, every dialectical tree has, at most, two levels.
Remark 3.3
Every dialectical tree whose root is marked as undefeated is a tree with just one node.
If the argument of the root has a child, this means that the root has a defeater and the root is then
defeated (since, from remark 3.1: there are no defeaters for the defeaters)
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Remark 3.4
In DELP∅ , a literal l is warranted iff any argument for l is not attacked.
If a literal l is warranted there is a dialectical tree, for an argument A supporting l, whose root
is marked as undefeated (from the definition of warranted literal in D ELP). This dialectical tree has
a single node (from remark 3.3 ) and this means that there is no argument attacking it. If there is
some argument that attacks the root A, it has to be in the tree and then the root would be marked as
defeated.
Remark 3.5
In DELP∅ an argument A is warranted iff every literal present in A is warranted.
This condition establishes that all literals contained in the defeasible derivation that constitutes a
warranted argument are also warranted. Suppose this is not true, then exists a warranted argument A
such that a literal Li present in A is not warranted. In this case, every argument for Li is defeated
and Li is an attack point in the argument A. Therefore, A is attacked and defeated (from remark 3.4),
which cannot happen, since we assumed that A is a warranted argument.
As mentioned, in DELP, two literals p and q disagree if Π∪ {p, q} is a contradictory set (Π is the
set of strict rules). If Π is empty, p and q must be complementary literals.
Remark 3.6
Let A be an argument in DELP∅ , if a literal p is present in A and there is an argument B for q such
that p and q disagree then A is not warranted.
In this case, B attacks A in p, for this reason A is defeated.
Remark 3.7 (Valid for general de.l.p.)
If there are no strict rules, p and q disagree iff p ≡ q.
4 DEFAULT LOGIC
A Default Theory T = 〈W,D〉 consists of a set of facts W of ground sentences. Each default rule in
D has the form a : b1 ,...,bn
c
(sometimes written a : b1, . . . , bn/c), where a is called the prerequisite, bi
are the justifications and c is the consequent of the default. When the justification and the consequent
of a default rule are the same, a : c
c
, the default rule is called a normal default rule. In general just(δ)
denotes the set of justifications present in the rule δ, and given a set of default rules R, just(R) is
used to denote all the justifications present in the default rules of R.
The intuitive meaning of a default is: if a can be derived and it is possible to consistently assume
each bi, then conclude c. Given a default theory T = 〈W,D〉 an extension E (or a Reiter extension)
is a theory E satisfying that
E =
⋃{Wi | i is a natural number }
W0 = W
Wi+1 = Th(Wi) ∪ {γ | (∃α : β1,...,βnγ ∈ D) ∧ ({βi} ∪ E 6` ⊥,∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n) ∧ (α ∈ Wi)}
Another way to characterize extensions in Default Logic is through an operational semantics [1].
In this characterization each extension is defined by a set In(Π), where Π is a closed and successful
process. Given a sequence of default rules S = 〈δ0, . . . , δn〉 the set In(S) collects the information
obtained by the application of the defaults in S; that is, In(S) = Th(W ∪ {γ | α :β
γ
occurs in S)})
Then, a process is a special kind of sequence of default rules 〈δ0, . . . , δn〉 where each default δk is
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applicable to In(〈δ0, . . . , δk−1〉). A process Π is closed if there is no applicable default rule δ in
D such that δ does not occur in Π, and a process Π is successful if In(Π) 6` β for all β that is a
justification of some default rule in Π. Given a default theory T = 〈W,D〉, a literal l is a skeptical
consequence of T if l belongs to every extension of T , and l is a credulous consequence of T if l is
present in some extension but not in each extension. A default theory that has at least one extension
is called coherent.
In this work, we will consider finite propositional default theories with the following restrictions 1:
1. The theory T = 〈W,D〉 is coherent.
2. The set of facts W is empty.
3. For every default α : β/γ, formulas β and γ are single literals.
We are interested, at this stage, in default theories that verify the condition: W = ∅, since working
with these theories enable us to establish an indirect relation between DELP an another nonmonotonic
formalisms. In particular, it is well known the works that study the relation between Normal Logic
Programming and Default Logic. This connection is achieved through a link between stable models
for normal logic programs [11] and skeptical consequences of default theories [4]. Normal logic
programs are translated into a default theory composed by an empty set of facts, and a set of default
rules obtained as follows. Each rule of the form:
c← a1 . . . , an, not b1, . . . , not bm
is translated into a default rule of the form:
a1, . . . , an : ¬ b1, . . . ,¬ bm/c
In this way, a relation between DELP and this type of default theories (with an empty set of facts)
establishes a indirect link between DELP and Normal Logic Programming. However, this relation
deserves a particular analysis.
5 TRANSLATING DEFAULT THEORIES INTO
DELP∅ PROGRAMS
In this section, we present a transformation that allows to map default theories to defeasible logic
programs. The transformation is defined for default theories that follow the restrictions given in
section 4.
Given a default theory T = 〈∅,D〉, we transform T into a de.l.p. P = (∅,∆) as follows:
1. For each default δi = α : β/γ ∈ D, the set ∆ in the de.l.p. P includes the following defeasible
rules:
(i) γ —≺ α, pi
(ii) ¬ pi —≺ β
(iii) pi —≺
where pi is a new literal and rules (ii) and (iii) are called guard rules, and β is the complement
of β.
1Some of these restrictions could be dropped. We analyse this situation later.
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When necessary, we denote the de.l.p. P as T DLdelp (T )
The first defeasible rule (i), indicates that if the prerequisite α is given, then the consequent γ could
be derived. However, this is only allowed if it is possible to consistently assume the justification, β,
and this restriction is verified when the second rule does not apply (ii). If the complement of the
justification, (i.e. ¬ β), is derived, there exists a derivation (and an argument) for ¬ pi and this
constitutes an attack to the argument for α. The last rule introduced by the translation (iii) is simply
used to enable, by default, the new literal pi.
The translation for a default rule δ = α : β/γ introduces a new literal pi to block the derivation
of γ. That is, in case that the complement of the justification is derived, literal pi turns into an attack
point, and the argument for the consequence will be attacked. Therefore, this argument is defeated
classifying the literal γ as UNDECIDED.
Note that default rules with an empty prerequisite are written true : β/γ. These rules are trans-
lated, in the same way, to the following defeasible rules:
(i) γ —≺ pi (ii) ¬ pi —≺ ¬ β (iii) pi —≺
Then, we will show that normal default rules can be translated in a simpler, reduced form.
Example 1
Consider the default theory T1 = 〈∅,D1〉, where
D1 = {(true : a/a), (a : ¬ x/y), (a : ¬ y/x), (a : d/d)}
The corresponding de.l.p. will be PT1 = (∅,∆1), where ∆1 has the rules:
true : a/a a —≺ p1 ¬ p1 —≺ ¬ a p1 —≺
a : ¬ x/y y —≺ a, p2 ¬ p2 —≺ x p2 —≺
a : ¬ y/x x —≺ a, p3 ¬ p3 —≺ y p3 —≺
a : d/d d —≺ a, p4 ¬ p4 —≺ ¬ d p4 —≺
Each default rule is translated into a defeasible rule, using an extra literal (pi) acting as a guard. A
derivation for ¬ pi implies that the justification (from the original default rule) cannot be assumed con-
sistently. In this way, the transformation captures, through these three defeasible rules, the behavior
of the original default rule.
Example 2
Consider a de.l.p. PT2 = (∅,∆2), obtained from a default theory T2 = 〈∅,D2〉, where ∆2 has the
rules:
b —≺ x, p1 ¬ p1 —≺ ¬ a p1 —≺
c —≺ y, p2 ¬ p2 —≺ b p2 —≺
x —≺ p3 ¬ p3 —≺ ¬ x p3 —≺
y —≺ p4 ¬ p4 —≺ ¬ y p4 —≺
This example shows the use given to the new literals pi introduced in the translation. Literal p2
determines an attack point in the argument for the literal c and this argument is defeated (see remark
3.5 and figure 1). For this reason, literal c is not warranted in DELP∅ , it is an UNDECIDED literal.
This attack reflects the incompatibility between the original default rules y : ¬ b/c and x : a/b. In the
original default theory, literal c is a credulous consequence, since no successful process includes both
default rules. There is only a successful process including x : a/b.
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x p1
b!
!!
p3! p4!
y p2
c!
!!
x p1
b!
!!
:p2!
Figure 1: Arguments in PT2
It is possible to identify in the de.l.p. P obtained by the translation, two kind of attacks. Note that,
every attack in P reflects the existence of two incompatible default rules2. This incompatibility arises
for one of the following reasons:
• the consequences of both default rules are contradictory, or
• the consequence of one of them is contradictory with the justification of the other
Figure 2(a) depicts an attack that arise from contradition between the consequences of two default
rules, and figure 2(b), an attack over a justification. In this case the (artificial) attack point is the new
literal introduced by the translation.
...
x pnc
:c!
! !
...
a pc
c!
!!
ba
c
: yx:c
:
(a) Consequence attack
...
a pc
c!
!!
...
x pnb
:b!
! !
:pc!
ba
c
: yx
:b
:
(b) Justification attack
Figure 2: Types of default attacks
It is interesting to note, that normal default rules could be translated in a more concise manner.
The translation of a general default rule α : β/γ has to model the two main characteristics captured
by a default rule:
- the antecedent α is needed to derive the consequent γ (i).
- there is no knowledge against the justification β (ii).
The translation is required to model, in DELP∅ , the interaction between conflicting information
in the same way it is done in Default Logic. Direct conflicts between default rules arise when their
consequents are contradictory or the consequent of one default is contradictory with the justification
of the other. For normal default theories justifications and consequents are the same, therefore, a direct
conflict between default rules arises when it is possible to derive information against the consequent
of a default rule. For this reason it is possible to give a reduced translation for normal default rules.
2We are considering two applicable default rules
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Remark 5.1 (Reduced transformation)
If the variant considered is DELP∅ , the translation of a normal default rule α : γ/γ can be reduced to
a single defeasible rule: γ —≺ α.
That is, in the reduced transformation any argument for ¬ γ attacks the argument for γ (see
figure 3). This attack establishes a defeat, because in DELP∅ , attack determines defeat. In the initial
transformation, any argument for ¬ γ allows the formation of an argument for the literal ¬ pi that
attacks (block), in the same way, the argument for γ. In this way, both transformations reflect, in the
obtained DELP∅ program, the same pretended behaviour of the original default logic.
Hence, in what follows, normal default rules will be translated using the reduced form
® pi
°!
!...
®
°
!
...
:pi!
:°
:°
Figure 3: Reduced transformation for normal defaults
In this way, a DELP∅ program obtained by translating the normal default rules into the general
form or into the reduced form, models in the same way the original default theory. The dialectical
analysis that could be carried out in any of these translations is equivalent, and this is because of the
comparison criterion. The only kind of defeaters present in DELP∅ are blocking defeaters. For this
reason, if an argument has two defeaters both are blocking defeaters. The elimination or addition of
defeaters does not change the scenario: the main argument remains defeated. These characteristics
are proper of DELP∅ , since using a different comparison criterion proper defeats can arise and, in
these situations, the elimination of one defeater could provoke others defeaters to change their status
(see figures 4(b) and 4(a)).
a pi
b
 blocking
defeat
 blocking
defeat
!
!
:b :pi!
:b
 blocking
defeat
a
b!
:b
DefeatedDefeated
(a)
a pi
b
 Blocking
defeat  Properdefeat?
 Blocking
defeat
!
!
:b :pi!
:b
:b
a
b!
UndefeatedDefeated
(b)
Figure 4: Defeats in DELP∅and general DELP
Remark 5.2 (Relation between DL and DELP∅)
Let T = (W,D) be a default theory, such that W = ∅, P the de.l.p. obtained by the translation
proposed, and l a literal.
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- Literal l is a skeptical consequence of T iff l is warranted from P 3.
- Literal l is a credulous consequence of T iff l is undecided in P
In order to understand this relation, we can analyze the relation between the processes determining
the extensions of the default theory, and the arguments that can be constructed using the defeasible
rules obtained by the translation.
Given a default rule δi = α : β/γ we define t(δi) as the set of defeasible rules obtained by the
translation of a default rule δi. Thus, in the general case t(δi) = {(γ —≺ α, pi), (¬ pi —≺ β), (pi —≺ )}.
In the same way, we define the set of defeasible rules obtained by the entire set of default rules D
as t(D) =
⋃
t(δi),∀δi ∈ D. Finally, given a de.l.p. P = (Π,∆) and a set R ⊆ ∆ we denote
argsP (R) = {A : 〈A,h〉 is an argument structure in P and A ⊆ R}.
Now, let Γ be a closed and successful process of a default theory T = 〈∅,D〉, E = In(Γ) be
the corresponding extension, Γs be the set of defaults rules in Γ (i.e. Γs = {δ | δ occurs in Γ}), and
P = T DLdelp (T ) be the de.l.p. obtained by the translation proposed. Note that arguments in argsP (t(Γs))
are conflict free; that is, for all argument A in argsP (t(Γs)) there is no other argument B attacking A.
Otherwise, conflicting default rules would belong to Γ, and this is not possible since Γ is a successful
process. Moreover, argsP (t(Γs)) is a maximal set of non-conflicting arguments since every argument
B that does not attack an argument in argsP (t(Γs)) comes from default rules that are not in conflict
with the rules in Γ. If such argument B exists, Γ would not be closed.
In this way, if a literal w is warranted from P there exists a non attacked argument 〈Aw, w〉 that is
in every maximal conflict-free set of arguments. Then, literal w will be in every extension of T and
it is a skeptical consequence of T . On the other hand, given a literal u if every supporting argument
〈Au, u〉 is attacked by other argument 〈Bu′ , u′〉 both arguments have to be in different conflict-free
sets of arguments. Therefore, two or more extensions exists and literal u cannot be present in all of
them. For this reason, u will be a credulous consequence of T . Note that, u is undecided in T DLdelp(T ).
5.1 Dung’s argumentation framework for DL
The relation established between Default Logic and DELP is, in some aspects, similar to the one
established in Dung’s work [9] which considers a default theory as an argumentation framework.
There, an argumentation framework AF (T ) = 〈ART , attacksT〉 is defined for a default theory T =
〈W,D〉, where:
- ART = {(K, k) | K ⊆ just(D) : K is a support for k}
- (K, k) attacksT (K
′, k′) iff k ∈ K ′
A set K is said to be a support for k with respect to T if there exists a default derivation
k1, k2 . . . , km with km = k such that for each ki , either ki ∈ W , or ki is consequence of the preceding
elements in the sequence or ki = γ for a default rule α : β1,...,βnγ such that α is a previous element in the
sequence and every βi is in K .
Defining this framework, Reiter’s extensions of a default theory T = 〈W,D〉 can be associated to
the stable extensions of ART . Remember that in Dung’s framework a set of arguments S is a stable
extension iff S = {A | A is not attacked by any argument in S}. On the one hand, given a set of
arguments A in ART the set of consequences it supports are defined: flat(A) = {k | ∃(K, k) ∈ A}.
On the other hand, given a set of consequences E, the set of arguments that are consistent with it, is
3We are considering just the original literals in the theory, not the pi literals added by the translation
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also defined: ARGS(E) = {(K, k) ∈ ART | ∀j ∈ K, {j} ∪ E 6` ⊥}. Therefore, E is a Reiter’s
extension of T = 〈W,D〉 iff E = flat(ARGS(E)).
Considering the transformation proposed, we can see that arguments from T DLdelp (T ) can be used
to identify the arguments of this argumentative framework. Suppose that 〈A, t〉 is an argument in the
de.l.p.T DLdelp (T ), we can define the following set of literals:
KA = {l : (¬ pi —≺ ¬ l) ∈ T DLdelp (T ) and (pi —≺ ) ∈ A}
This set KA constitutes a support for literal l with respect to T . That is, (KA, l) ∈ ART in Dung’s
framework. Observe that every argument 〈A, l〉 in T DLdelp (T ) is constructed using the defeasible rules
obtained by the translation. However, the existence of a supporting argument for l is because of the
presence of a set of default rules (in the original default theory) that allows a default derivation S
for l. The default rules that could be used in T = 〈W,D〉 for constructing S are identified by the
literals pi mentioned in A. If a defeasible rule pi —≺ is present in A, the default rule δi is used for the
construction of S, and this means that its justifications, just(δi), can be consistently assumed.
5.2 Dropping some restrictions
In section 4 we establish some restrictions for the default theories considered. On the one hand, we
are considering default rules such that their justification are single literals. This restriction can be
dropped, since given a default rule of the form α : β/γ where β = β1, . . . , βn with each βi is a single
literal, the translation is given by the rules
(i) γ —≺ α, pi1 , . . . , pin
(ii) ¬ pik —≺ βk for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n
(iii) pik —≺ for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n
On the other hand, we are considering only default theories with an empty set of facts. This
condition could be dropped translating all clauses in W as strict rules in the de.l.p.. In this case, W
has to be consistent and each formula is translated as a set of contrapositive rules as strict rules in the
de.l.p.. For each clause C = (c1 ∨ . . . ∨ cn) in W we include, for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the strict rules in
the de.l.p.:
ci ← ¬ c1, . . . ,¬ ci−1,¬ ci+1, . . . ,¬ cn
Example 3
Given the theory T3 = 〈W3,D3〉 where W3 = {(x), (w), (t → ¬ b)} and D3 = {(x : b/b), (w :
t, r/q)}. The associated de.l.p. P3 has the rules:
x← b —≺ x ¬ pt —≺ ¬ t pt —≺
w← q —≺ w, pt, pr ¬ pr —≺ r pr —≺
¬ b← t
¬ t← b
Finally, note that we are considering coherent default theories (i.e. the existence of extensions are
guaranteed). As mentioned in [9] having default theories with default rules of the form α : β/¬ β
prevents to conclude any literal, since this kind of defaults collapse the theory, and none extension can
be obtained. Under the preferred semantics (instead of the stable ones), this non intuitive behavior is
avoided because this paradoxical default does not interfere with the others. In case of DELP∅ and the
translation proposed, the behavior will be similar in the case of non coherent default theories. The
defeasible rules obtained by the translation of this conflicting kind of defaults will not interfere with
the arguments supported by meaningful defaults.
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5.3 Answers and Extensions
It is interesting to note that the relation established in this work associates types of consequences
(skeptical or credulous) from a Default theory with the answers (YES,NO, UNDECIDED) given by
a DELP∅ interpreter. However, the concept of extension, present in Default Logic, is not clearly
recognizable in DELP∅ and for this reason it is not possible, without an extra analysis, to identify the
notion of extension in the defeasible program obtained by the translation. For instance, if two literals
are UNDECIDED in a T DLdelp (T ), they could belong to the same extension of T , or they could belong
to differents extensions. Hence, the match between literals and extensions cannot be recognized by
DELP∅ by considering just the answer given by the interpreter. An external mechanism should be
provided.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
There are several works, in the field of Knowledge Representation dedicated to relate different for-
malisms and semantics of nonmonotonic reasoning formalisms [3, 5, 9, 7, 12, 13, 2, 8]. We think that
it is significant to carry out this work since, as mentioned before, it is important to asses the differ-
ent alternatives present in the area. There are very different approaches for nonmonotonic reasoning
and is useful to clarify the relationship among them. However, this task is not easy mainly because
several dissimilar approaches have been developed. This work presents a first analysis on the relation
between a well understood nonmonotonic system as Reiter Default Logic, and a argumentation based
system like DELP. Many works have been developed relating Default Logic, or some of its variants,
to other nonmonotonic formalisms [9, 7, 12].
The transformation presented in this work allows to map Default Theories to a special variant of
DELP (the simplest variant). In this way, default theories can be modeled by simple de.l.p.’s and this
result allow us to extend this work to other formalisms, mainly over those whose correspondence with
Default Logic (of some of its variants) have been already defined.
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